Solana validators must therefore manage two orders of magnitude more data than Bitcoin validators. It would be convenient in the extreme if a small handful of exchanges accumulated a large portion of supply in PoS networks, and then submitted (as they ultimately must and will) to increasingly onerous regulation. So, the exchange CEOs that lionize purportedly ecological PoS and dismiss the merits of PoW should be careful what they wish for. So, it stands to reason that FTX leadership would align itself with "ecological" PoS, eliminating what has historically been the most strident objection to public blockchains from the Youtu blog the policy crowd. At this point, exchanges would simply become deputized - just as banks are today - into carrying out state policy, which could well extend to controlling public blockchains at the protocol layer. Public blockchains exist to eliminate centralized points of control and to remove the political constraints that are inherent in traditional finance. Over the last couple of years the cryptocurrencies are gaining the momentum and for any trader it is suggested that they don't miss the rally. Just last week, the Parliament "unanimously voted" to approve these bills in its second reading.

Last year when Mizuho became one of the 25 banks which have joined R3CEV consortium for distributed ledger technology. SWIFT, to a world of stablecoins, MetaMasks and Layer 2 protocols, the state will have to develop new ways to control financial flows. The combination of PoS and large quantities of coins held in regulated exchanges or banks is one that is very conducive to the state reasserting control over these nominally-decentralized systems. PoS networks explicitly grant control and discretion to the largest stakeholders, so at this point, the jig would be up. While FTX’s analysis is off base on the question of fees and PoW, we can nevertheless sympathize with the desire of an exchange operator to align itself with proof-of-stake networks, and to minimize the importance of PoW networks. But we would argue that even though the naive analysis suggests that exchanges should, as a group, support and foster the growth of PoS while marginalizing PoW, this is unwise in the long run. There are already examples of exchanges being used to influence PoS networks, as occurred when Justin Sun colluded with Binance, Huobi and Poloniex to commandeer the Steem network.

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Needless to say a trader's top weapon would be his strategy; here, the newsletters play important roles as with them they are able to access information even before the other traders are able to get from media. However, those who have access to the latest and updated Bitcoin newsletter can stay assured about the information they need while trading. The more legitimate businesses that use Bitcoin, not only will the overall Bitcoin economy grow in general, but the more difficult it will become for governments to cramp down on the exchanges as it will have a legitimate use. Miners, on the other hand, use these cycles to help handle peer-to-peer processes associated with bitcoins. Let us say you want to use the coins for trading or staking, and the coins need to be on hand for faster transfer. This is known as a 51% attack because you need to control more than 50% of the network to attempt it.

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Ethereum is a bit more complex and computationally intense than Bitcoin, but still far more limited than Solana in terms of the computational work validators must do to maintain the ledger. Solana validators, at current rates, must process around 100 GB per day of data, or 36 TB per year. At current rates, Solana produces approximately 550-times more blockspace than Bitcoin per day. A PoS network could be completely costless from an energy perspective and constrict block space, causing fees to emerge; a PoW network could increase blockspace and drive fees to zero. Solana can offer users more abundant blockspace and therefore a cheaper all-in transactional experience, but this comes at a cost. After all, if you can influence the world toward an outcome in which PoS-based monetary goods are dominant, and you run a large custodial exchange which stands to accumulate lots of those PoS assets, your incentives are clear. These exchanges voted with user funds in Sun’s favor, demonstrating an obvious principal-agent problem created by the custody of PoS assets. Unless you are eager to be deputized into a hall monitor for the new financial system, it is best to repudiate the influence that helming a PoS network would grant you.